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Abstract- Wireless Sensor Networks refers to a multi-hop 
packet based network that contains a set of mobile   sensor 
nodes.  Every node is free to travel separately on any route 
and can modify its links to other nodes. Therefore, the network 
is self organizing and adaptive networks which repeatedly 
changes its topology. The relations among nodes are 
restricted to their communication range, and teamwork with 
intermediate nodes is necessary for nodes to forward the 
packets to other sensor nodes beyond their communication 
range. The network’s broadcasting character and transmission 
medium help the attacker to interrupt network. An attacker can 
transform the routing protocol and interrupt the network 
operations through mechanisms such as selective forwarding, 
packet drops, and data fabrication. One of the serious routing-
disruption attacks is Wormhole Attack. The main emphasis of 
this paper is to study wormhole attack, its detection method 
and the different techniques to prevent the network from these 
attack. 
 wormhole attack, classification, detection 
mechanism, wsn, security, routing protocols.  
I. Introduction 
n Wireless Sensor Networks, the nodes use the open 
air medium to communicate with each other, in doing 
so they face sensitive security problems as compared 
to the wired networks. One such dangerous problem is 
wormhole attack. In this attack, two distant malicious 
nodes can plan together using either wired connection 
or directional antenna, to give an feeling that they are 
only one hop away. Wormhole attack can be executed in 
hidden or in sharing mode. Wormholes can either be 
used to examine the traffic throughout the network or to 
crash packets selectively or totally to affect the flow of 
information. The security mechanisms that are used for 
wired systems such as authentication and encryption 
are useless under hidden mode of wormhole attack 
because the nodes do not modify their headers but only 
forward these packets. But the attack in participating 
mode is more complicated, because if it once launched, 
it is difficult to detect.  
WSN faces some challenges which are as follows:  
1. Power Consumption – conservation of power is 
necessary and detection of some power saving 
routing protocol. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2. Multicast Routing – scheming of multicast routing 
protocol for a frequently changing WSN 
surroundings  
3. Internetworking – Communication among wired 
system and WSN while maintaining synchronization.  
II. Security Goals Designed for Wireless 
Sensor Networks 
Security goals for WSN can be categorized as 
primary and secondary goals [35]. Some of the primary 
goals are Data Confidentiality, Data Authentication, Data 
Availability and Data Integrity and secondary goals are 
Data Freshness, Secure Localization, Self- Organization 
and Time Synchronization. The primary goals are also 
known as standard security goals. 
Primary goals are as follows: 
a) Data Confidentiality 
Confidentiality is the capability to hide 
messages from a passive attacker such that every 
message communicated using the sensor network 
remains confidential. It is the most important concern in 
network security. A sensor node should not expose its 
data to its neighbors. 
b) Data Authentication 
Authentication ensures the consistency of the 
message by identifying its foundation. Attackers in 
sensor networks can not only responsible for the 
alteration of packets but can also insert additional fake 
packets [34]. Basically data authentication is used for 
the verification of the identity of the senders and 
receivers. Symmetric or Asymmetric mechanisms are 
used for data authentication in which sending and 
receiving nodes share secret keys. Because of wireless 
medium and unattended nature of sensor networks, it is 
very demanding to ensure authentication. 
c) Data Integrity 
Data integrity in wireless networks is desired to 
ensure the consistency of data and to verify that a 
message has not been altered, tampered with or 
changed. Though the system has secrecy measures, 
but still there is a possibility of alterations. The integrity 
of the system will be in dilemma when: 
• A wicked node present in the network adds false 
data. 
I 
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• Due to wireless channel unstable conditions can 
cause harm or loss of data [33].
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d)
 
Data Availability
 
Availability ensures whether the resources are 
free to be used by a node and whether the network is 
existing for the messages for communication. However, 
failure of the base station or cluster leader’s availability 
will eventually threaten the entire sensor network. Thus 
data availability has a main importance for maintaining 
an operational network.
 
Secondary goals are as follows:
 
e)
 
Data Freshness
 
Even though confidentiality and data integrity 
are guaranteed, there is also a need to make sure the 
freshness of each message. Basically, data freshness 
[33] ensures that
 
the data is new and no old data have 
been replayed. To resolve this trouble related counter 
will be added into the packet to guarantee data 
freshness.
 
f)
 
Self-Organization
 
A wireless sensor network is a usually an ad 
hoc network, in which every sensor node is independent 
and flexible such that each nodes is self-organizing and 
self-healing to different situations. No permanent 
infrastructure is present in a wireless sensor network for 
network management. This natural feature challenges 
the wireless sensor network security. So if self-
organization is absent in a sensor network, then the 
harm that results from an attack or from the risky 
environment may be disturbing.
 
g)
 
Time Synchronization
 
Most of wireless sensor network applications 
are based on some type of time synchronization. 
Moreover, sensors tries to calculate the end-to-end 
delay of a packet as it travels from source to destination 
sensor or node. A shared sensor network can require 
group synchronization [33] for purpose of tracking 
applications.
 
h)
 
Secure Localization
 
The effectiveness of a sensor network is based 
on its ability to locate each sensor node in the network 
correctly and automatically. Now a days, sensor 
networks designed to locate faulty nodes which will 
require the accurate location information. An attacker 
can easily operate all the non protected location 
information by exposing the replaying signals and false 
signal strengths etc. 
 III.
 
Wormhole Attacks
 Wormhole attack contains two nodes that are 
connected to one another with the a medium that is
 
not 
offered to normal nodes, due to which the nodes can 
communicate with one another over a range in which 
normal nodes cannot. These two colluding nodes are 
operated such that they shown like a neighbors to all the 
other nodes. In [Figure 1], suppose node-1 wants to 
send any data to node-25 through the network, so node-
1 broadcasts the route request. Let node-Xs and node-
Xd are the two colluder nodes in the locality of source 
node and destination node. Now Xs along with other 
nodes in the network gets the
 
route request from source 
node, it replays the same request to Xd, Xd receives the 
request and de-capsulate it and rebroadcasts it to its 
neighborhood. After receiving the route request through 
Xd the destination node-25 will think that they are direct 
neighbors to source node-1, and it will reply to that route 
request. Xd will then capture that reply and using the 
same process it will send it to Xs; which further send to 
node-1. Thus node-1 and node-25 will believe that they 
are 2- hop neighbors. And complete communication will 
pass through Xs and Xd. This is one type of wormhole 
attack; many more number of variants are defined in the 
literature [3], [4], [5].
 
 
Figure 1
© 2014   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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A Survey: Detection and Prevention of Wormhole Attack in Wireless Sensor Networks
IV. Classification of Wormhole Attacks 
In [6], [7], [8]; Wormhole attacks can be 
classified on the basis of: 
1) Its Implementation 
2) The medium used 
3) The attackers  
4) The location of victim nodes. 
a) Classification based upon Implementation 
This is the most important classification; which 
depends upon the behavior the attack is launched. 
i. Using Encapsulation 
In this manner, there are some nodes are 
occupied along the path (these nodes may or may not 
be conscious of wormhole) between xs and xd. The 
packet gets encapsulated at xs and travels through the 
path in encapsulated form to avoid the increase in the 
hop count. In this case the attackers are not directly 
connected to one another rather make the other nodes 
believe that they are directly connected. These packets 
are transmitted between xs and xd using a virtual tunnel. 
Once this attack is successfully launched, then all the 
paths will contain a link that will contain of link between 
xs and xd. 
ii. Using Out-Of-Band Channel 
These colluder nodes get connected directly 
through a out of band channel having high bandwidth. 
The channel can be obtained by a wired connection or 
using a wireless connections. The requirement of extra 
hardware made it difficult to launch, but provides a 
simplicity because it will not require any 
encapsulation/de-capsulation while the colluders are 
directly connected. 
iii. Using High Power Transmission 
This type of wormhole particularly launched 
from two colluder nodes that facilitates high power 
transmission potential. 
iv.
 
Via Protocol Deviations
 
In this case the attackers generate the 
wormhole by not following the protocol set of laws e.g. 
Some  protocols suppose the nodes to wait for a while 
before  retransmitting but the attackers keeps on 
broadcasting and do not obey  this rule and thus trying 
to reach first at the destination and thus avoiding any 
future genuine requests to reach destination. If the future 
requests arrive at destination, they will be dropped, 
since a request passing through the colluder has 
previously been received. 
 
b)
 
Classification based upon Medium Used
 
On the basis of medium used, wormhole 
attacks can be classified as in-band and out-of-band 
wormhole attacks.
 
 
 
i. In-Band Wormhole 
Same medium will be used by the attackers for 
creating link between them e.g. protocol deviations, 
packet relay and, encapsulation. 
ii. Out-Of-Band Wormhole 
Like normal network nodes attackers do not use 
the same medium, e.g. High Transmission Mode and 
Out-Of-Band Channel. 
c) Classification based upon Attackers 
i. Self-Sufficient 
Here colluder nodes present themselves as 
normal nodes and thus all paths passes through them 
e.g. using high power transmission or out-of-band 
channel.   
ii. Extended Wormhole 
The colluder nodes extends the attacks beyond 
themselves to normal nodes and are unseen by 
themselves e.g. packet relay or encapsulation. 
d) Classification based upon location of Victim nodes 
i. Simplex 
The victim node is present inside the range of 
only one attacker. 
ii. Duplex 
The victim node is present inside the range of 
both the attackers. 
V. Literature Review 
A significant amount of work have been 
prepared for the detection of wormhole attacks and the 
attackers. The work ranges from suggestion of extra and 
exclusive hardware to minor modifications in the system 
protocols and suggestion of smart ways of avoiding or 
detecting the wormholes. However some can need extra 
hardware and other require extra processing and battery 
life. This section shows a small review of the 
approaches proposed till date. 
Hu et al. [16] proposed the method in 2003 
based upon geographical and temporal packet leaches. 
In this method to avoid the wormhole, the geographical 
location or temporal location is used to bound the 
distance travelled by the packet. This approach is 
restricted by condition of GPS technology or the time 
synchronization. Lazos et al. [17] proposed a method in 
2005 where a few nodes are mandatory to be equipped 
by GPS locators and directional antennas. This 
procedure uses “local broadcast keys” for safe 
communication between one another. 
Tran et al. and Phuong et al. proposed TTM 
(Transmission Time based Mechanism) in 2007, where 
every node in the pathway work together and attack is 
identified through route setup stage by calculating 
transmission time among two nodes. Venkataraman et 
al. in 2009 proposed a graph theoretic mechanism for 
© 2014   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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A Survey: Detection and Prevention of Wormhole Attack in Wireless Sensor Networks
the finding of wormhole attacks, which is right for 
proactive protocols. 
Chen et al. [18] proposed a secure localization 
approach in 2010 based on the inconsistent set based 
resistant localization. Graaf et al. [19] proposed a 
dispersed detection approach based upon ranges of 
nodes for the detection of wormhole attacks. A Vani et 
al. [20] proposed a solution in 2011 that combines the 
decision anomaly, neighbor list count and hop count 
methods for AODV protocol. This procedure depends 
upon hierarchical processing of nodes and their 
respective neighbors. They used the hop count 
information available in the routing table of the nodes 
which needs that we need to store two copies of routing 
table of every node so as to maintain the track of earlier 
hop counts. 
VI. Routing Protocols and Wormhole 
Attack 
Various routing protocols are existing for WSN. 
Some of the often used routing protocols are 
considered in this section and the risk of wormhole 
attacks to such protocols is described. These routing 
protocols are classified into two types: proactive / table-
driven protocols and reactive / demand-driven protocols 
[1]. AODV, DSR and Ariadne are reactive routing 
protocols and OLSR, DSDV and SEAD are proactive 
routing protocols. 
a) OLSR (Optimized Link State Routing)  
It is a proactive routing protocol in which 
information of the topologies get exchanged 
periodically. Hello messages are transmit to determine 
single hop neighbors. To allocate signaling traffic, 
flooding system is use. In this system each node 
forwards flooded message that was not forwarded by 
them earlier. The topology messages contains all the 
information about link states that are sent to all other 
nodes. With the help of this information, partial topology 
graph are obtained by every node after calculating the 
shortest path using symmetric relations. Now this 
system is open to wormhole attack [9] – [11]. Isolated 
nodes can send hello and topology manage messages 
are available at its colluding nodes to its personal 
neighbors for broadcasting fake information into the 
system. This will create two distant nodes to mistakenly 
believe themselves as neighbors, that leads to the 
failure of routing protocol.  
b) DSDV (Destination Sequenced Distance Vector)  
It is a proactive routing protocol, in which all the 
metric, destination routes, sequence number generated 
by the destination node and next hop to each 
destination are maintained in a table [1], [2]. Every node 
in the network acts as a router and the table gets 
updated periodically by exchange of messages among 
neighboring routers. This protocol is open to wormhole 
attack [9]. By using a tunnel, the colluding nodes 
surpass message between two distant nodes, suppose 
X and Y which will results X and Y to consider 
themselves as neighbors and they will publicize a hop 
count of one among each other. As a result of this false 
information, if the alternative route has hop count more 
than one then all other authenticated nodes will aim to 
send the messages through X to destination Y.  
c) DSR (Dynamic Source Routing)  
It is a reactive routing protocol because it 
discovers the required routes only after it has packets to 
transmit to the destination. It wants source route 
maintenance because during the utilization of the route, 
it is necessary to check the operation of the path and to 
report the sender regarding the errors [2]. It is at risk to 
wormhole attack and denial of service attack at the 
destination [9]. This protocol ensures forwarding of just 
the first RREQ that it will received and will reject all other 
RREQ packets for the same route. This RREQ packet 
contains the intermediate nodes and the hop count 
information. The route then established is used to send 
data packets. As wormhole attack ensures a fast 
channel for forwarding messages, so as compared to 
other paths RREQ packet through them will arrived at 
destination faster. This will result in only the wormhole 
path to be discovered as the route to destination. The 
wormhole attacker discards the data packets totally or 
partially that results in denial of service attack at the 
destination.  
d) SEAD (Secure Ad-hoc Distance Vector)  
This protocol depends upon on one-way hash 
chains rather than asymmetric cryptograph and protects 
the network from uncoordinated attacks and DoS 
attacks. Several nodes have the ability to authenticate all 
other elements of the chain. This requires authenticating 
the metric of the routing table and the sequence 
number. The receiver should also verify the sender [2]. 
Thus, an enemy is not able to send routing message 
without compromising a node, as it does not give 
authentication code to its neighbors [12]. Although 
SEAD effectively handles replay attack, it is incapable to 
handle the wormhole attack [13] by a malicious node 
that are replaying the message from an unauthenticated 
node as a repeater.  
e) AODV (Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector)  
It is an on-demand routing protocol which 
broadcasts RREQ messages to its immediate neighbors 
for sending messages to final destination and in turn 
these neighbors rebroadcast them to their neighbors. 
This whole process continues unless until the RREQ 
message reaches the destination. On getting the initial 
RREQ message from the source, the destination node 
sends a RREP to the source node through the same 
reverse path [1], [15]. All the in-between nodes also put 
forward route entries in their respective table. The 
© 2014   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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A Survey: Detection and Prevention of Wormhole Attack in Wireless Sensor Networks
neighboring nodes forward route error message to all its 
neighbors after detecting fault in any link to a node. This 
will again start a route discovery procedure to change 
the broken link. This AODV routing protocol is also at 
risk to wormhole attack [9].  
As wormhole attack ensures a fast channel for 
forwarding messages, so as compared to other paths 
RREQ packet through them will arrived at destination 
faster. In this protocol, the destination rejects all the later 
on RREQ packets received, yet they are from 
authenticated node. Hence the destination chooses the 
fake path through wormhole for RREP [1]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Prevention of Wormhole attack in AODV using WSN 
f) Ariadne (A Secure On-Demand Routing Protocol for 
Ad-hoc Networks)  
This protocol depends on symmetric 
cryptography and ensures that the source can 
authenticate each intermediate node in the route and 
the destination node authenticates the source. All 
intermediate node can eliminate or insert nodes in the 
list of nodes of the route request. It uses the key 
management protocol known as TESLA that focuses on 
the clock synchronization to authenticate routing 
Start 
Simulation 
Nodes Deployment for the requisite WSN 
Implementation of Wormhole attack in the 
AODV routing protocol 
Scenario Generation to carry out the effect 
of wormhole attack 
Result analysis to distinguishing the effect 
of wormhole attack 
Implementation of isolator to detect and 
prevent simultaneously the wormhole 
attack in AODV 
  
Apply proposed algorithm to further 
prevention of wormhole attack and for 
broadcasting safe communication 
Result analysis and comparison for the 
desired metrics like end-to-end delay 
End 
Simulation 
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messages. TESLA uses per-hop hashing method [2]. An 
authentication done at each node does not only 
depends upon the information contained in the RREQ 
packet but also depends the authentication code of the 
preceding node. Ariadne protocol is free from over-
flooding of RREQ attack because the attacker is 
prevented from replaying the message due to the 
network-wide shared secret key. It is necessary for each 
node to insert authentication code to every RREQ 
packet that it forwards. Then the source can be able to 
authenticate the origin of all individual data field in the 
RREP packet [14]. It is protected from rushing attack 
wormhole and attack [13] while successful route 
distortion requires RREQ to be tailored cautiously.  
VII. Detection and Avoidance of 
Wormhole Attacks 
From past few years the main area of research 
is the detection of wormhole attack. The most important 
task is to discover the occurrence of wormhole in the 
system [12], [24] – [31].  
Detection of wormhole on the basis of the Hello 
control messages [26]. With the use of OLSR 
specifications, the percentage of HELLO Message 
Timing Intervals (HMTIs) which lies in a range enclosed 
by the amount of jitter. A range R = [T - δ, T + δ] have 
been defined. If HMTI is in the range R, then it will 
considered to be valid; otherwise it is said to be out-of-
protocol. A second check is made every time when the 
HMTI packet behavior is doubtful. On other side, a badly 
performing node would get coupled with it a 
comparatively large number of repeat packets, that 
would not be the case by an attacking node. In this way, 
the false positive alarms problem gets negotiated.  
A new protocol known as Multi-path Hop-count 
Analysis (MHA) is proposed on the basis of hop-count 
analysis to stay away from wormhole attack [24]. It is 
supposed that very low or very high hop-count is not 
good for the network. The uniqueness of the hop-count 
analysis for detecting wormholes nodes is yet uncertain.  
Wormholes nodes are detected by assuming 
that wormhole attacks have longer packet latency as 
compared to the normal wireless propagation latency in 
a single hop [10]. As the route during wormhole seems 
to be shorter, various new multi-hop routes be also 
channeled in the direction of the wormhole that leads to 
the longer queuing delays. The links having delays are 
considered to be doubtful links, as the delay might also 
takes place due to congestion as well as intra-nodal 
processing. The OLSR protocol is used for routing. This 
approach aims to sense the suspicious link and 
authenticate them in a two step process that is 
described below.  
In first step, Hello packets has been sent to all 
the nodes that are within its transmission range. As soon 
as the receiver receives the Hello message, then it 
records the address of the sender and the time delay Δ 
left until it will be programmed to send its next Hello 
message. The node attaches the address of the sender 
and their respective values of time delay Δ that has 
recorded for piggybacked reply. When Hello reply is 
received by a node, then it checks for the information 
related to any of its outstanding requests. But if no such 
information is there, then it will suppose it as any other 
control packet. Otherwise, node checks the arrival time 
of Hello reply message to notice whether it is arrived 
within its scheduled timeout interval by considering the 
time delay Δ that occur at the receiver side. If the arrival 
time is within its timeout interval then link between itself 
and node is taken to be safe, otherwise doubtful and 
communication to that node is terminated by the sender 
until the verification process gets over.  
In second step, a probing packet is sent to all 
the suspected nodes (that are detected in the previous 
step) by the sender.  
If a suitable acknowledgement is received from 
any node X within its scheduled timeout interval then 
node X is considered to be safe. Otherwise the 
occurrence of wormhole is proved.  
Both delay per hop indication (DelPHI) and hop 
count are monitored for wormhole detection [22]. The 
basic assumption is that the delay that packet 
experience in standard conditions for propagation of 
one hop will become too high under wormhole attack as 
the actual path between the nodes is shorter than the 
advertised path. This proposed methodology for 
wormhole detection is a two-step process.  
The first phase has the route path information, 
gained from a set of disjoint paths from sender to 
receiver. Every sender will consist of a timestamp on a 
unique DREQ packet and send it to receiver after 
signing it. After receiving the packet for first time every 
node will adds its node ID then increase the hop count 
by 1 and rejects the packet next time onwards. After 
receiving each disjoint path the receiver send the DREP 
packets. This process is carried out for three times and 
the hop count and smallest delay information will be 
chosen for wormhole detection. 
In second phase, the time difference between 
the packet it had sent to its neighbor and the reply 
received by it known as round trip time (RTT) is 
calculated. Delay per hop value (DPH) is evaluated as 
RTT/2h, where h stands for hop count to the particular 
neighbor. Under ordinary circumstances, a smaller h 
also have smaller RTT. However, smaller hop count will 
have larger RTT under wormhole attack. But one DPH 
value for node X exceed the consecutive one by several 
threshold, then path from node X to every another paths 
with DPH values greater than it is considered as under 
wormhole attack.  
Similar propositions are made in SaW [29] and 
DaW [30]. In SaW, AODV protocol was used and in 
© 2014   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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DaW, DSR routing protocol was used. In these papers, 
security models have been planned and used to detect 
interruption. To detect the attacks, it will use statistical 
methods. If any link is identified to be doubtful, then 
existing information is used to detect the presence of a 
wormhole. In trusted model, nodes monitor their 
neighbors on the basis of packet drop pattern but not 
on the basis of number of drops. Other algorithm has 
been proposed in [30] to detect the presence of 
wormhole into system. In this algorithm, the source waits 
for RREP after sending the RREQ. The source receives a 
lot of RREP from different routes. By using the below 
expression we can find out the link with very high 
frequency:  
   Fi= pi /P, for all Li  
                         Fmax = max (Fi),  
 
where r is the set of all obtained routes, Li is the ith link, 
pi is the number of times that Li appears in r, P is the 
total number of links in r, and Fi is the relative frequency 
that Li appears in r. If Fmax > Fthreshold, then check 
the information present in RREP of that route. The node 
will be malicious if the value of correlation coefficient for 
packets dropped is greater than the pre-set threshold 
value t, then  it will inform the operator otherwise 
continue with routing process. 
 
According to [29] and [30], the regular link 
frequency analysis may lead to fake detection of 
wormhole attacks. Though, these recognize the 
performance of a wormhole as they record the total 
number of packet
 
drops rather than the pattern of drop. 
 
The wormhole attack can be detected using 
multipath routing [27]. When a source node wants a new 
route, it will broadcast the RREQ into the network and 
wait for responses. Then the in-between node will 
forward only the first RREQ packet. After receiving the 
first RREQ the destination will wait for a while to gather 
all the obtained routes. A new scheme known as 
Statistical Analysis of Multi-path (SAM) is projected in 
[27]. SAM uses Pmax
 
(i.e. maximum probability of 
relative frequency of a link to occur in the set of all 
obtained routes from one route discovery) and Ø (i.e. 
difference between the most frequently appeared link 
and the second most frequently appeared links in the 
set of all obtained routes from one route
 
discovery), 
which will be higher in the presence of wormhole attack. 
Relative Frequency is calculated using probability mass 
function (PMF) which is more for a network that is under 
wormhole attack as compared to a normal network. The 
performance of Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) and On-
demand multipath routing (MR) protocol are compared 
under wormhole attack. 
 
A cluster based counter-measure known as 
WHIDS [28] is proposed for the wormhole attack. By 
using MATLAB simulation results the effectiveness of 
WHIDS are revealed for detecting wormhole attack. This 
method, yet not been experienced in existence of 
multiple wormhole attacks. 
 
Vu et al. proposed the technique to detect the 
existence of wormhole node using two phases [31] as in 
[10] and [22]. The first phase contains of two methods: 
In first method, the computation of round-trip-time (RTT) 
among the source and all of its immediate neighbors is 
measured. In second method, source identifies its one-
hop and two-hop neighbors to form its neighbor set. If it 
is originated that the destination is not the neighbor of 
source node then the link between them will be taken as 
suspicion. After detecting the doubtful links, the next 
phase is used to verify the presence of wormholes for 
exchange of messages by using the
 
RTS / CTS 
mechanism.
 
Table 1 represents multi-aspect comparison 
among eight different wormhole detection techniques. 
Significant aspects like false alarm detection, the node 
mobility along with QoS parameters are considered for 
each detection technique. This qualitative study have 
been supported by quantitative one also for several 
algorithms using the network simulator tool. 
 
Table 1 :  Summary about the detection methods for wormhole attack. 
Method Mobility QoS 
Parameter 
Synchronization False detection 
WORMEROS [31]  
 
Topological change is 
not considered  
 
Not considered  
 
Time synchronization not 
required. RTT between 
source node and 
destination node is 
considered  
Both false positive and 
false negative alarms 
are considered  
HMTIs [26]  
 
Handled weakly. 
Topologically robust, 
short range worm-hole 
can be detected  
Jitter and delay Not required. Since PSD 
profiling is done locally 
Used PSD to detect 
false positive alarm 
Farid et al. [10]  
 
Not considered  Packet 
processing 
time, queue 
  
 
Some time delay added 
to detect suspicious 
links 
Not handled 
DelPHI [22]  Not considered  Delay Not required Not handled 
© 2014   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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SAM [27]  
 
Cluster and uniform 
topology considered  
Not considered Not considered Not handled 
SaW [29]  Not considered  Not considered Not considered Failed to detect 
DaW [30]  Not considered  Delay 
parameter 
Not considered Failed to detect 
WAP [23]  
 
Maximum transmission 
distance is calculated  
Delay per hop Only the source node is 
synchronized  
Not handled 
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